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ABSTRACT 
Subject of this paper is the method of the creative subject, as used by Brouwer after 1945. We 
shall interpret it in such a way that, in our opinion, it arises naturally from intuitionistically 
accepted concepts. The reconstruction will be carried out in a Kripke model. 
1NTRODUCTlON 
In a number of papers published after 1945 Brouwer introduced a new 
device. In constructing counterexamples for classical theorems he seemed to 
refer explicitly to the activity of an idealized mathematician. This so-called 
method of the creative subject is controversial, also within intuitionism. 
The first attempt to formalize the new method was done by Kreisel ([Kr 671); 
it was further elaborated by Myhill ([My 681) and Troelstra ([Tr 691). The 
resulting theory of the creative subject, TCS for short, is strong enough to 
obtain Brouwer’s result. But the interpretation of its terms is somewhat vague, 
it does not fully explain Brouwer’s argument and there is a paradox, discovered 
by Troelstra, which has not been resolved satisfactorily. 
These questions play a minor role in the work of two more recent authors 
on this subject, Martin0 ([Ma 821, [Ma 851) and Posy ([PO 761, [PO 771). Their 
main interest is the application of the TCS in other parts of Brouwer’s work. 
We want to show that Brouwer’s method can be interpreted in such a way 
that it arises naturally from intuitionistically accepted concepts. This recon- 
struction suggests an interpretation of the basic term I-, of the TCS, which 
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leads to a theory that does not suffer from the shortcomings mentioned above. 
Our reconstruction can be carried out in a certain type of Kripke model. 
The material of this paper is arranged as follows: in part I we present succes- 
sively the best known example of the new method, a short discussion of the 
TCS, the paradox and our reconstruction. In part II we shall interpret our 
informal analysis in terms of Kripke models. In part III we relate the new 
method with Brouwer’s choice sequences, and suggest a more general appli- 
cation of our version of the TCS. 
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1.1. In [Br 481 it is shown that there exists a real number a for which the 
relation a 20 holds, but for which a#0 cannot be proved. Real numbers are 
here equivalence classes of convergent sequences of rational numbers. Relations 
on reals are defined via their representatives, e.g. the relation x<y holds iff for 
any representative (b,), of x and (c,), of y, 
1.1.1 ZlkZn Vm(cn+,-b,+,)>2-k; 
x>y holds iff y<x holds, and x#y iff x<y\/y<x. 
Brouwer’s argument runs as follows: 
Let A be a non-tested proposition, i.e. neither 1 A nor 1 1 A has been 
proved. Then the creative subject (CS for short) can create, in connection with 
A, an infinite sequence of rationals (a,),, according to the following direction. 
As long as, while choosing values for a,, the CS has neither proved A nor 
1 A, a, is chosen to be 0. 
As soon as, between the choice of ak and a,&+, , the CS has obtained a proof 
of A, then for all n>O, ak+n is chosen to be 2-k. 
And as soon as, between the choice of u1 and a/+i, the CS has obtained a 
proof of 1 A, then for each n > 1, a,, is chosen to be - 2 -‘. 
Clearly, (a,), is a convergent sequence, and it defines a real number, say a. 
Does a> 0 hold? If so, a<0 would be impossible, so it would be certain that 
7 A could never be proved, so 1 1 A would be known, and A would be tested, 
which it is not. So a > 0 does not hold. 
Analogously, if a< 0 were to hold, a>0 would be impossible, it would be 
certain that A could never be proved, so 1 A would be known and A would 
be tested, which again, it is not. 
Finally, from a = 0 it would follow that neither a < 0 nor a>0 would be 
possible, and, as above, 1 A and 1 1 A would be known, which is a contra- 
diction. So a#0 does hold. 
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2. The TCS has been developed with the purpose of analysing the concept 
of the CS, as used above by Brouwer. In this theory the time is supposed to 
be divided into discrete stages, on which the CS, a correctly thinking subject 
(Kreisel) or an idealized mathematician (Troelstra), performs his mathematical 
activity. The key-notion is “The CS has a proof of A at stage PI” expressed by 
The properties of ~~ A depend on how far one idealizes (e.g. does having 
a proof of A imply having a proof of its logical consequences, etc.). Not every 
author is equally precise, and there are divergences between the various authors. 
The discussion is concentrated on the following axioms; A is an arbitrary 
formula, m and n are natural numbers. 
A 2.1 I-,Av 1 I--~A; 
A 2.2 I-,A-+ + tl+t?l A; 
A2.3 S’n+,,A+A; 
A 2.4 lYnF,,A-+lA; 
A2.5 A-t&i-,A. 
Some authors hesitate to accept A 2.5, and replace it by the weaker A 2.4, 
since it seems to express that the CS proves any true proposition. A 2.3 is 
accepted in all formalizations; it seems to express that the CS proves only 
intuitionistically true propositions. 
The axiom system Al . . . A5 can be added to the intuitionistic logic with 
preservation of consistency, as appears from the construction of a model by van 
Dalen ([vD 781). The fact that the system itself is consistent, can also be seen 
by adding c, A *A. 
The system is strong enough to derive Brouwer’s result. Since I-, A + 
-+ 1 I--~ 1 A is derivable, one can define, for an untested ‘proposition A: 
a,=0 iff 1 t-,A& -I ä ,,TA; 
a,=2-k iff 1 t-,/t & +k+rA & n>k; 
a,= -2-l iff 1 I-/ 1 A & I-/+] 1 A & n>l. 
(a,), obviously defines a real, say a. From the supposition a>O, it would 
follow that A holds, via 
a>0 + Zln ~~ A (from the definition), and 
5% t-, A + A (A 2.3). 
Analogously, from a < 0, 1 A would follow, and from a = 0, 7 7 A & 7 A 
would follow. 
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It is a curious fact that Brouwer does not reason in this way. From the 
supposition a> 0 he derives 1 1 A via 
a>O-+ 7 a<0 
It seems that Brouwer deliberately did not use A 2.3. If he had wanted to do 
so, he did not have to resort to an untested proposition, but instead, he could 
have used an undecided proposition (neither A nor 1 A have been proved). 
3. From the assumption that the CS proves his results one by one, which, 
by making the stages sufficiently small, amounts to at most one new result at 
each stage, Troelstra has derived a paradox ([Tr 691). We present it here below. 
Let PO, . . . , P”, . . . be the list of the new results of the CS, one at each stage. 
Let L(a) mean: a is a lawlike sequence of natural numbers. We define a 
sequence of natural numbers b by 
b(n) = a(n) + 1 if P”=L(a), for some a; 
b(n) = 0 otherwise. 
Although b is not recursive, intuitively it is lawlike ‘, so it follows from 
A 2.4 that 
Suppose that the CS proves L(b) at a certain stage no. In that case 
P”“=L(b), and @no) = @no) + 1, which is a contradiction, so 
For the CS to be a coherent notion, it is crucial to solve the paradox. 
Troelstra discusses two possible solutions. The first is to admit infinitely many 
new results at a stage, and change the meaning of t-n A into the more cautious 
“The CS has evidence for A at stage n”. The second one is to introduce levels 
of self reflection. We will not elaborate these solutions further, there is another 
way out. 
The paradox can be avoided if we denote by the CS ourselves (or “we”), and 
if we let the starting point of the stages be now i.e. at the moment of using the 
concept of CS, one lets the stages cover the future. Thus all the new results of 
the list PO, . . . . P”, . . . lie in the future. 
We are inclined to say that the sequence b, defined in connection with this 
list, is, in the terminology of Brouwer, a choice sequence. But if we interpret 
the concept of lawlikeness such that it includes b, then L(b) holds now, and it 
will not occur in the list Pc’, . . . , P”, . . . , which are all future results. However, 
if we suppose that past results remain valid, we may not conclude to 
7 5% t-n L(b). 
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We prefer this solution because we think it is the key to a more satisfying 
reconstruction of Brouwer’s reasoning. 
4. An inspection of [Br 481, above 1.1, shows that the conclusions about 
(a,),, the sequence that the CS can construct, are drawn only from its initial 
conditions and from the assumption that if it is certain that a proposition will 
never be proved, its absurdity would be known. Not one value of (a,), is 
actually used, and the only condition the CS must satisfy, is that it is able to 
construct proper mathematical objects. 
We used CS as an abbreviation of creative subject, which has become con- 
ventional, but Brouwer himself used the expression creating subject. Since in 
Brouwer’s philosophy mathematics is a creation of the human mind, this could 
mean nothing but “the one who performs mathematics”. If so, Brouwer, in 
using his method, just invites the reader to reflect over a sequence he can 
construct, to convince himself of the result. The method of the CS becomes a 
thought experiment, which can be carried out by any one who has adopted 
the intuitionistic conception, i.e. accepting incomplete objects ((a,),) as 
meaningful. 
If one wants to describe this thought experiment with the language of the 
TCS, the meaning of t-,4 that forces itself upon us, is: “at the n-th stage 
from now I shall have a proof of A “. I- n A may hold because we have already 
now a proof of A (it will remain valid in the future), or because we have a 
method showing that A will hold at stage n. Adding ~~ to the intuitionistic 
logic enables us to express a distinction in proofs. 
In Intuitionism, asserting the truth of a proposition A means asserting that 
we have a construction showing its truth. We now require of such a con- 
struction that it can be carried out completely at the moment of asserting. If 
the construction depends on future events, we use the symbol ~~ (or Zln I-~). 
Someone familiar with recursion theory may think of the distinction recursive 
versus recursive in some oracle F; a proof of t--,4 might for example use the 
first n values of a function, which values are determined in the future. 
EXAMPLE. Let B be an undecided proposition. In connection with B, we can 
define a sequence of natural numbers b as follows: 
As long as we have not found a proof of BV 1 B, b(n) is chosen to be 0. 
If we have found, between the choice of b(k) and b(k+ l), a proof of 
B v 1 B, we choose bsz (b(k+ n) = 1). 
Let I--~ denote the stage between the choice of b(n) and b(n + 1). For an 
arbitrary no we have 
t- ,,” (b(no) = 0 v b(n,,) = l), so 
%I F n (b(no) = 0 v b(n,) = 1). 
However, b(n,) =0 v b(no) = 1 does not hold*, since it would imply that 
we know already now, whether or not we will have a proof of BV 1 B at 
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stage no, which in general is not true. For the same reason ä -~,b(n~) =OV 
v 1 ä -~,b(n~) =0 does not hold. Hence, A 2.1 and A 2.3 are not valid under 
the new interpretation of kn. Of course A 2.2 and A 2.5 (so also A 2.4) are 
trivially true now. 
For the reconstruction of Brouwer this has the consequence that, since A 2.1 
is not valid anymore, we cannot define (a,), completely, as in 1.2. This is what 
is to be expected if we interpret Brouwer’s method as above, because then 
(a,), is a choice sequence, all of its values yet undetermined. But accepting 
the definition of (Q,,)~, as choice sequence, as meaningful and denoting the 
stage between the choice of a, and a,,+, by I- ,,, we have, for the untested 
proposition A 
1.4.1 %r I-,,A+a>O and 
1.4.2 Eln~,~A-+a<O 
from which, with A 2.4, Brouwer’s result follows. Notice that the untestedness 
of A is now crucial. 
We end this informal analysis with some concluding remarks. The TCS as 
developed by Kreisel-Myhill-Troelstra is a theory about an idealized mathe- 
matician. In our interpretation no such idealized mathematician occurs; the 
axioms are principles to be used when the future is involved in reasoning. 
It is not our intention to use the TCS for expressing the so-called weak 
negation, i.e. to express “I have no proof of A” by 1 F,A, which is done by 
Posy and Martino. We interprete 1 kn A as “The assumption of I-~ A is 
absurd (leads to a contradiction)“, and in the models of the next part, 
1 t-,A-+ 1 A is valid for each n. 
11.1. A Kripke modelforpropositional logic is a triplet 3y= (K, 2, D) such 
that K is a set, partially ordered by 2, and D is a function, assigning to each 
k E K a set of basic propositions Dk, such that k 2 k’=, Dk 1 Dk,. We define the 
relation II- between elements of K and formulas of the intuitionistic proposi- 
tional logic, IPC for short, as follows: 
(9 k IF A, A a basic proposition, iff A ED, 
(ii) k IF A & B iff k I+ A and k II-- B 
(iii) kI~AVBiffkl~AorkIt-B 
(iv) k IF A + B iff Vk’zk (k’ IF A * k’ II- B) 
(v) k II- 1 A iff Vk’zk (not k’ IF- A). 
A formula A is valid in yl, Xi= A, iff Vke K (k II- A). It is well known 
that A is derivable in IPC iff for every X, Xi= A (completeness for Kripke 
semantics). 
Below we will restrict ourselves to models for which K is a set of finite 
sequences of natural numbers such that: 
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1) ( ) EK (the empty sequence belongs to K) and 
2) (xg,...,x,,x,+,)EK* (xo,...,x,)~K&~~(xo,...,x,,x,+l,m)EK, 
and 2 is such that 
1) VkEKkZ() 
2) (Yo, -*-9 Ym)l(Xo,.*., x,) iff nlm and Xi=yi for i=O, . . ..n. 
In these models, we call them suitable models, the length of an element of 
K is defined by: 
Ih(x,,, . . . , x,)=n+ 1. 
Obviously, in a suitable model LX, XI= A iff ( ) IF A holds for every 
formula A. We shall call a formula valid if it is valid in all suitable models. 
2. Below we carry out the reconstruction of I.4 in a suitable model. One 
may think of ( ) in the model as representing the state of knowledge at the 
moment of the thought experiment, i.e. the collection of formulas A for which 
( ) lt- holds; k, k# ( ), represents a possible extension of that knowledge at 
the moment of choosing a(lhk). First we have to extend IPC and the definition 
of II-. This is done in two steps. 
The interpretation of I- ,,: we extend the clauses for formulas building of 
IPC by: 
If A is a formula, then k-n A (for each n) 
and Eln ~~ A are formulas, 
and we add the axiom 
2.2.1 I-,A -5% E,A. 
We extend the definition of lt by: 
04 k IF +,A iff b;rc’zk (Ih(k’)-Ih(k)=n * k’ II- A); 
(vii) k IF ?I% E,A iff for some n, k IF F,A. 
One easily checks that A 2.2, A 2.5 and 2.2.1 are valid formulae. A 2.1 and 
A 2.3 are not valid: 
Counterexample k, * 
v 
kz k, I!- A, k2 IF- 1 A; 
for A 2.1 (n= 1): not kO IF I--,Av 1 t--,-A. 
ko 
Counterexample k, 
for A 2.3: 
ko 
k2 A~&,\4,&A~4,\D~,; 
not k. I/-- A, but k. It- I-,A. 
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The choice sequence op. Let X be a suitable model, P a basic proposition. 
In connection with P we can assign to each k EK a rational number s(k) as 
follows: 
s(k) = 0 iff neither k IF P nor k IF 1 P; 
s(k) = 2-’ iff Zlk’Vk”(kg k’ & k’ II- P & Ih(k’) = I & k’z k” + not k” II-- P) 
s(k)= -2-m iff Zk’Vk”(k~k’ & k’ IF 1 P & Ih(k’)= 
= m & k’z k” + not k” IF 1 P). 
K together with the assignment s is called the spread S(K, P). An element of 
the spread S(K, P) is an infinite sequence of rationals s(k,J,s(k,), . . . such that 
Ih(k,)=i+ 1 and ki+,~ki. 
An element of a spread can be given to us by a law. For such elements we 
use the variable ap. An element can also be generated by, possibly restricted, 
successive choices of initial segments. Let ap be an element the values of which 
are chosen without any restriction on the freedom of choice. 
We shall not distinguish in our notation between an element and the real it 
generates in expressions such as up> 0 (see def. 1.1.1). To handle ap formally, 
we make a further extension of IPC; we add the clause: 
If P is a basic proposition, a,>O, a,<0 
and ap = 0 are all formulas. 
For b E S(K, P) and k E K we define b E k 
iff b(0) = s(xO), . . . , b(n) = s(x,) for k = (x0, . . . , x,) 
or k=( ), 
and we extend the definition of IF- by: 
(viii) k N- a,>0 iff Va,Ek a,>O; 
(ix) k IF apcO iff Va,Ek ap<O; 
w k lt- a,=0 iff b’apEk ap=O. 3 
The definition is such that, for a model X, X!= ap>O iff for the real 
generated by apE S(K, P) ap>O holds, etc. 
It is easy to check that the following formulas are all valid (P and arbitrary 
basic proposition). 
2.2.2 ap>O -+ 1 ap<O; 
2.2.3 ap<O --t 1 a,>O; 
2.2.4 ap=O-+ 1 ap>O & 1 ap<O; 
2.2.5 5% l-.P+ap>O; 
2.2.6 Eln I-, 7 P-t a,cO. 
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3. Let X be a suitable Kripke model such that for the basic proposition A, 
neither XI= 1 1 A nor .%I= 1 A holds. 
Suppose 3i! E oA > 0; because of 
cr,>o -+ 7 aA<o (2.2.2), 
1 aA<O -+ 1 L% I-~ 1 A (2.2.6), 
~Zi%~,A-r-~/l (A2.4), 
it would follow that X E 1 1 A holds, which it does not. So .X I= oA > 0 does 
not hold. Similarly, from XI= oA <0 would follow X!= 1 A because of 2.2.3, 
2.2.5 and A 2.4; X!= oA<O does not hold either. Finally, from .X!= oA =0 
follows that XI= 1 A & 1 1 A holds because of 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.6 and A 2.4, 
SO xi= (yA#O holds. 
We conclude that oA #O + oA # 0 iS not valid. 
4. Because of the results of this paper, we propose to restrict the ES, as 
far as it concerns the axioms from 1.2, to A 2.2 and A 2.5, I-,A interpreted 
as in 1.4. They can be extended by the following formulas, which are all valid: 
2.4.1 Fn(L4 8z B) *(t-nA & l-nB); 
2.4.2 (l--,/l v t-.B) + l-n(A vB); 
2.4.3 I-,(A+B)+(l-,A+ l--B); 
2.4.4 I-,lA~l l-,/l. 
If we define 1 A as A -+ I, 1 .+-,A -+ kn -A is a special case of 
(+ n A + I-~ B) -+ I-~ (A + B). This last formula is not valid. 
Counterexample for kl k2 k, IF A & -, kl lt- B, 
(t-,,A+I--.B)+t-,,(A+B) k2 IF B & 7 k2 II- A. 
(for n= 1) ko 
The counterexample does not work for the special case, since K II- I does 
not occur (by definition of II- ). It also shows that + n (A v B) + (I-~ A v I-~ B) 
is not valid. 
For our purpose it was sufficient to restrict ourselves to propositional logic. 
However, we can easily generalize the concept to the predicate logic. 
DEFINITION. A Kripke model for predicate logic is a quadruple X = (K, 2, 
0, I+ > such that: K is a set, partially ordered by 2, D is a function, assigning 
to each kE K a set Dk, such that k’z k*D,,>D,; I+ is a relation between 
formulae of the predicate logic and elements of K such that for a formula 
4x,, *--, x,,) and al,..., a, E Dk the following holds: if k IF A(a,, . . . , a,) and 
k’z k, then also k’ I- A(al, . . . . a,). 
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The clauses of &, v, + and 1 are the same as in the propositional case, the 
clauses for the quantifiers are: 
(xi) k IF YxA(x) iff A’aeD, k lb- A(a) 
(xii) k I; bTxA(x) iff Vk’zk VaED,, k’ IF A(a). 
Definitions of suitable model, h(k), k IF I-~ A and k It &‘n I-,A are all as 
above, but one should make a distinction between the existential quantifier in 
E?xA(x) and in Fin I--,A; they are interpreted differently. 
It appears that 
2.4.5 Zlx I-,A(x) + +,,FZxA(x) and 
2.4.6 En VxA(x) -+ v-x I-.A(x) 
are valid formulae. 
III.1 We interpreted a CS-sequence as a choice sequence. As it appears to 
us, for Brouwer every choice sequence was a CS-sequence. In the same period 
when Brouwer introduced the method of the CS, he used the expression CS in 
his definitions as the one who chases the values of a choice sequence (e.g. 
[Br 521, C.W. p. 512). 
According to our interpretation, by using the expression CS Brouwer only 
made explicit his idealistic position. The new element of the method of the CS 
is not the introduction of an idealized mathematician, but the systematic 
application of individual choice sequences in mathematical practice. Possibly 
apart from the proof of the negative continuity theorem in [Br 271 (discussed 
a.o. in [PO 761 and [Ma 851) there is no example of an individual choice 
sequence in the work of Brouwer outside the context of the CS. 
2. Also according to our interpretation, one reasons about a choice 
sequence before one value has actually been chosen, only initial conditions, 
which may include future events, are used. Thus, the theory of choice se- 
quences, including our version of the TCS, possibly has a more general appli- 
cation in tense logic. 
In a famous passage of De Znterpretatione Aristotle discusses whether the 
statement “Tomorrow there will be a seabattle” has a definite truthvalue. If 
so, it seems to imply that the future is determined, and if not, it would be 
an example of the failure of the excluded third. To handle this problem 
Lucasiewics developed a logic with a third truthvalue, reserved for these 
socalled future contingents.4 
Since the failure of A v 1 A, one might think of the application of intui- 
tionistic logic, but caution is advisable. Intuitionisticcally, A v 1 A means “We 
(I) have a proof of A or such a proof is impossible”, leaving open the possibility 
of a future proof of A. It is the extension by kn and 3n F n that seems to 
make the system appropriate. 
We shall concentrate our attention on the statement “Tomorrow (stage m) 
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I will prove A”. This is not expressed by I-~A, since this expression means “I 
will attain a proof of A between now and stage m”. For a formal treatment 
we need a further extension of the language: 
If A is a formula and n E R\l, 
then A, is also a formula. 
The corresponding clause of lt is: 
(xiii) k IF A, iff Zlk’jkVk”jk’(lhk’=m & k’ It- A & k”#k’* not 
k” IF A). 
Note that Ihkzn * (k IF 1 A, if not k IF A,). We have the following 
formulas: 
3.3.1 I--~ (A, v 1 A,), which is valid, and 
3.3.2 F,A,v 1 EVA,, which is not valid. 
These formulas suggest that one should distinguish between “Tomorrow (I 
will prove A or not)” and “Tomorrow I will prove A or tomorrow I will not 
prove A”, and that the last statement is not valid in natural language. 
NOTES 
1. The reason for calling a CS-sequence (also called empirical sequence) 
lawlike, is presumably that, in interpreting the CS as an idealized mathe- 
matician with a definite description of the stages (acceptance of A 2.1), there 
does not seem to be an element of choice in the determination of its values. 
It has also a formal justification. One can derive from A 2.1-A 2.4, for any 
proposition A (cf. the definition of a in 1.2) 
zx( Vx(a(x) = 0 v a(x) = 1) & 
(zzx(a(x) = 1) + A) & 
(Vx((a(x)=O) - 1 A)). 
This is known as Kripkes scheme KS-. It has been proposed to add KS- to 
intuitionistic analysis for handling empirical sequences. The scheme is in- 
consistent with existing formalizations of the theory of choice sequences, even 
if one drops the first conjunctive part, for which A 2.1 is needed (see [My 701). 
To distinguish between empirical sequences and lawlike sequences not in- 
volving the CS, the latter arfe called absolutely lawlike or mathematical. 
In our analysis A 2.3 is not valid anymore, and consequently, neither is 
Kripke’s scheme. 
2. One might wonder whether b(n,) exists. For if so, b(n,)=Ov b(no) = 1 
would hold. Our answer is that b(n) exists from the moment its value has been 
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determined. We express this in terms of Scott’s E-logic: 
Vn(Eb(n) + (b(n) = 0 v b(n) = 1)) & 
Vnm( k n Eb(m) - m z 4. 
3. The o+clauses of the definition of I!- are justified by [Tr 771 in the 
following way: in the terminology of [Tr 771, czp is a lawless sequence (II- 
sequence) for the spread S(K, P). For I/-sequences we have the axiom of open 
data: 
A(a) -+ %(cr E k & VIE &l(p)), a; p D-sequences, 
expressing that if A(a) holds, this must appear from some initial segment of a, 
so A holds for any ll-sequence with the same initial segment. Since we want 
k I/-- A(ap) to hold iff CZ~E k * A(Q), we arrive at 
I. k I+ A(a,) iff VPEkA(j3). 
According to the elimination theorem ([Tr 771, Ch. 3) there exists a trans- 
lation 7 of sentences of EL (a system containing parameters for U-sequences) 
into sentences of ZDB (a system without choice parameters) such that EL I- A 
iff ZDB I- 7(A). For a prime formula A, 
II. r(b;BekA(~))= VaekA(a), 
a ranging over lawlike sequences. The definition follows from combining I 
and II. 
4. For a recent contribution to this subject and further references, see 
[Th 841. 
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